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ADVISABILITY OF WITHHOLDING DECISION IN FEDERAL COURT PEND-
ING STATE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF UNSETTLED STATE LAW
A federal form of government does not necessarily predicate two court
systems, the one national and the other local. Congress, however, by the
first Judiciary Act1 exercised its constitutional power 2 to create a separate
federal court system. Since that time, as a necessary incident to the nation's
political and economic metamorphosis and the attending complexity of rules
governing social conduct, the federal and state courts have developed into
highly complex organisms each having special adeptness when applying its
own law. This has often presented delicate problems of reconciling their
respective jurisdictions and competencies. 3 Although Congress has occasion-
ally been called upon to settle such problems,4 the courts have been required
to work out the solutions themselves for the most part.
Where a state court is confronted with a case involving only state issues
or a federal court is called upon to decide a case in which only federal
questions are present no problem of reconciliation exists. And where a federal
court is called upon to decide issues of state law only, or the state court of
federal law only, difficulties are undoubtedly presented but are not of great
magnitude.' But when either system is presented with a ease involving an
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73.
2. U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
3. In Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254, 259 (1921), Mr. Chief Justice Taft described
the necessity of comity between the state and federal courts:
We live in the jurisdiction of two sovereignties, each having its own
system of courts to declare and enforce its laws . . . It would be im-
possible-for such courts to fulfill their respective functions without em-
barrasing conflict unless rules were adopted by them to avoid it. The
solution requires, therefore, not only definite rules . . ., but also a
spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote due and
orderly procedure.
4. 50 STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C.'§ 1342 (1948), prohibits injunction of state
public utility rate regulations where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy is avail-
able in the state courts. 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (1948), forbids injunc-
tion of state tax orders on substantially the same basis. 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1948),
provides or a .special. three-judgeLxourt.insuits lo. enjoin.the execution, of. tate statutes
or administrative orders. Where the controversy is to be determined by state law, statu-
tory or otherwise, the more severe inequities have been eliminated by Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U" S. 64 (1938); for'-ive have assurance that in. deciding; local questions,
a federal court will follow the same precedents observed Jy the state tribunals.
5. In Meredith v. Winter-Haven; 320 U. S. 228 (1943), jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship. The Supreme Court held that:
In the absence of recognized public policy or defined principle guiding
the eiercise of 'the jurisdiction .conferrd; :which,:\dtfcf in, xeepfional'.'
cases warrant its non-exercise, it las from tke first been deemed to be
the duty of federal courts, if their' jurlisdlion is properly invoked, to
decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of
judgment.
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admixture of federal and state law the court, whether state or federal, must
give serious consideration to the desirability of proceeding to judgment.6
This note deals with the last of these situations further refined to the
problem presented when a federal court cannot decide the federal question
until it first resolves a question of local law which is, in the light of state
decisions and statutes, in doubt. There are two areas where the federal courts
are confronted with this problem :7
(1) Where the necessity for determining a constitutional question
depends on the court's interpretation of unsettled issues of state law,
8
or where the state question may present an independent ground for
invalidating a state administrative order.
(2) Where the application of a federal statute depends on the court's
interpretation of unsettled issues of state law.10
In either situation the state courts may reach an opposite result in a
later decision dealing with the unsettled state issue.1" To avoid this the federal
courts, exercising a discretionary power, have at times declined jurisdiction
leaving the parties to pursue an appropriate action in the state courts, thereby
insuring an authoritative pronouncement of the unsettled state question. In
these cases the Supreme Court has frequently reviewed the federal courts'
exercise of discretion in refusing to hear the case on the merits or, where
the court proceeded to judgment, its interpretation of the applicable state law.' 2
6. See note 11 infra.
7. These questions are presented to the federal court by direct petition seeking to
invalidate a state statute or other provision claimed to be in conflict with federal law or
the Constitution. The question also arises where a construction of state law, prior to
interpretation by the state courts, is necessary, but where petitioners do not ask that the
act be invalidated or the suit dismissed. Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472 (1948) ; Rail-
road Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940) ; Connecticut Ry. & L. Co. v. Palmer, 305 U. S. 493
(1938).
8. A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929).
9. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168 (1942); Railroad Comm'n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941).
10. Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472 (1948) ; Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 335 U. S. 701 (1948); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478
(1940).
11. A construction by the federal courts gives way to a later construction of the
highest state court. Chicago, St. P. & P. R. R. v. Risty, 276 U. S. 567 (1928) ; Sioux
County v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238 (1928) ; Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S.
499, 508 (1889) ; Green v. Lessee of Neal, 6 Pet. 289 (U. S. 1832). It would appear that
a construction by a state intermediate appellate court is also binding in a federal question
case, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 165 (1948). Cf. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311
U. S. 169 (1940), where jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
For a discussion of the problem presented when the state courts are confronted with
this question see Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A.2d 89 (1948), 1
STAN. L. RFv. 551 (1949).
12. Cases are plentiful wherein the federal courts have refused to hear the case.
A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946) ; Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323
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This doctrine of self-limitation 3 had its genesis in the desire of the
federal courts to avoid friction with state policies and to minimize the
difficulties presented when deciding complicated questions of state law. 4
In order to justify this exercise of discretion the Supreme Court has
alluded to "extraordinary circumstances" which warrant a refusal to hear the
case. For this reason a federal court may decline to interfere with state
criminal prosecutions except when moved by most urgent considerations; or
to obstruct the state administrative function of prescribing local rates for
public utilities; or to appraise or shape domestic policy of the state governing
its administrative agencies.'-
In addition the federal courts have considered certain general factors
in arriving at an appropriate course of action. Some of these are the
length of time that the controversy has been in the process of litigation,
inconvenience or cost to the parties. Although not controlling, any one of
them may be of sufficient gravity to move the court to hear the case without
further delay.' 6 Other influencing factors are the adequacy of state pro-
cedures to afford an easy and ample means for determining the unsettled
U. S. 101 (1944) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1942) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest
Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168 (1942); Texas Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496 (1941) ; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 312 U. S. 45 (1941). For decisions
where the court entertained the matter and gave judgment see Propper v. Clark, 337
U. S. 472 (1948) ; Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 335 U. S. 701 (1948) ;
Meredith v. Winter-Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1945) ; West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311
U. S. 223 (1940) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940).
13. There are no constitutional objections to this rule of self-limitation by judicial
discretion. Congress could and, until 1875, did withhold from the lower federal courts
jurisdiction in this class of cases. 18 STAT. 470 (1875). And the grant of jurisdiction
does not carry with it the obligation to exercise it. The Supreme Court itself has imposed
limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See note 12 supra; 40 HARv. L. REv.
969, 985 (1927). In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947), the Supreme Court
stated that a federal court is not bound to respect the jurisdictional choice of plaintiff no
matter what type of suit or issues are involved, but may under proper circumstances
decline jurisdiction.
14. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168 (1942) ; Railroad Comm'n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941) ; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 312 U. S. 45
(1941) ; Di Giovani v. Camden F. Ins. Asso., 296 U. S. 64, 73 (1935) ; Pennsylvania v.
Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935) ; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 345 (1930) ; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between the United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 520 (1928) ; Isseks, Jurisdiction of the
Lower Federal Courts to Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State Officials, 40 HARv. L. REV.
969, 985 (1927). Commenting on A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946), the
writer in 22 IND. L. 3. 87 (1946) concludes that the decision rests on a basis of convenience
in a situation involving substantial economic import in the particular state. 20 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 217 (1946) ; 56 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1943) ; 41 CoL.. L. REV. 925 (1941).
15. See Meredith v. Winter-Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 235 (1943), and cases cited.
16. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943) ; Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio
v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456 (1943), 56 HARV. L. REv. 825 (1943). But see
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168, 172 (1942), where Mr. Justice Douglas
stated that "Considerations of delay, inconvenience and cost to the parties . . .do not
call for a different result. For we are here concerned with the much larger issue as to
the appropriate relationship between federal and state authorities, functioning as a har-
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state law,1 7 or the existence of litigation pending in the state courts at the
time an identical action is brought in the federal court.""
The majority of cases have arisen where an unsettled state issue 9 is
inextricably connected with a question of constitutionality. In these cases,
the court's refusal to entertain the matter was justified on the ground that
the court will avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions when at all possible.2"
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.21 an action was brought in
the district court to enjoin the enforcement of the commission's order for-
bidding the operation of sleeping cars without a pullman conductor. The
issues presented alternative grounds for invalidating the order. If invalid it
could have been set aside either as unauthorized under the Texas statute, or
as violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the federal court, to avoid need-
monious whole." If the district court declines jurisdiction appeal of its order will cause
no further delay as proceedings in the state court will not be affected. But it has been
suggested that such orders would not be appealable, by analogy to remands. 7 U. OF CHI.
L. REV. 727, 732 (1940). The doctrine might have the deterrent effect of influencing
litigants to avoid the federal courts and thus prevent delay.
17. Compare Burford v. Sun Oil Corp., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), where the Supreme
Court noted that expeditious and adequate review of the matter was available in the
state courts, with Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 (1946), where an opposite
conclusion was reached on the grounds that an adequate state remedy was doubtful. A. F.
of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U. S. 496 (1941). See note 4 supra.
18. A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946) ; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co.; 279 U. S. 159 (1929) ; 56 HARv. L. REv. 825 (1943) ; cf. Johnson v. Drainage
Dist., 126 F.2d 23, 25 (8th Cir. 1942).
For a thorough discussion of these considerations, see 25 IND. L. J. 365 (1950), where
the writer deals with a new doctrine concerning stay of proceedings in diversity cases
when a concurrent suit is pending in a state court.
19. Whether the underlying issue of state law necessitates the interpretation of a
state statute or the common law of the state should not be determinative of the federal
court's exercise of discretion in accepting or refusing jurisdiction. Railroad Comm'n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941) (state statute) ; A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327
U. S. 582 (1946) (state constitutional amendment) ; Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940) (state common law). Similarly, a distinction should not be
drawn between a petitioner's request for equitable relief, such as injunction of the chal-
lenged activity, and a suit at law. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947) the
Supreme Court stated that a federal court is not bound to respect the jurisdictional choice
of plaintiff no matter what type of suit or issues are involved. No such distinction is
apparent in the forum non conveniens cases. Ibid.; cf. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
Steamship, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 423 (1932), where the Supreme Court stated that courts of
equity and of law occasionally decline to exercise jurisdiction; Heine v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 45 F.2d 426 (D. Ore. 1930), aff'd, 50 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1931). The power to
decline jurisdiction would seem to be inherent in every court where a more appropriate
forum exists. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 130 (1933) ; 54 HAR. L.
REv. 1379 (1941). For an opposite view see 20 So. CALrF. L. REv. 217 (1946).
20. A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946); Spector Motor Service v.
McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168
(1942); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); cf. Thompson
v. Consolidated Gas Utility Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937).
21. 312 U. S. 496 (1941), 41 COL. L. REV. 925, 54 HARV. L. Rav. 1379, 50 YALE L. J.
1272, 19 TEX. L. Rav. 86 (1940).
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less friction with state policies, should refuse to hear the case until the state
courts had interpreted the statute. The Court reasoned that the state court's
construction might render the order invalid, in which event constitutional
adjudication by the federal court would be unnecessary. They also noted that
the state law afforded an easy and ample means for determining the commis-
sion's authority to make such an order.
A similar result was reached in A. F. of L. v. Watson, 22 where suit was
instituted in the district court to enjoin the enforcement of an "anti-closed
shop" amendment to the Florida Constitution on the ground that it violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to resolve the constitutional issue it
would have been necessary to construe the heretofore uninterpreted state
amendment. One interpretation of the amendment would make a decision of
the constitutional question inescapable while the alternative answer would
eliminate the necessity entirely. Thus a decision by a federal judge powerless
to stamp binding precedent on the state issue before him, even incapable of
declaring a rule of more than transitory validity for the instant case, might
result in the formation of a constitutional precedent on the basis of a hypo-
thetical grievance. The Supreme Court again referred to the adequacy of
state procedures to determine the issue and to the fact that litigation was in
progress in the state courts at the time. By refusing to hear the case un-
necessary friction with state policies could be avoided without undue hardship
to the parties. When a similar situation was presented in Chicago v. Field-
crest Dairies, Inc.,23 the Supreme Court not only directed that the district
court should refuse to entertain the matter but that it should disregard con-
siderations of delay, inconvenience or cost to the parties as well.24
The more difficult problem is presented where jurisdiction is based on a
federal statute and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before
deciding the federal issue.2 5 Since no constitutional question is involved, the
federal courts are unable to base their decision on a reluctance to decide such
questions. This was the situation in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.21
where jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked under the Bankruptcy
Act. Title to oil found on the right of way of a railroad in reorganization
depended on whether the right of way was a fee simple or an easement. The
Supreme Court ordered conservation of the oil pending an action in the
22. 327 U. S. 582 (1946), 22 IND. L. J. 87, 20 So. CALM. L. Rav. 217.
23. 316 U. S. 168 (1942). Application by the dairy for a permit to market milk in
paper containers was refused by the Chicago Board of Health because of a 1935 ordinance
permitting delivery of milk in "standard milk bottles" only. The order was challenged
as conflicting with a state statute and as violative of the Dairy's constitutional rights.
24. See note 16 supra.
25. Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472 (1948) ; Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 335 U. S. 701 (1948) ; Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490 (1946) ; Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940).
26. 309 U. S. 478 (1940).
INOTAS
Illinois courts to determine ownership of the land. Here 'neither e6nsidera-
tions of constitutionality nor interference-with a recogriized state policy *ere
involved. Absent also were the concomitant extraordinary circumstances pre-
viously relied 'on to justify the district court's action in decliing jurisdiction
where the state law was unsetted.2 7 The Court's position rested solely-on a
desire to substitute a rule by the state courts with some probability of achiev-
ing duration for a decision by the federal court possessing little of the coin
of predictability Unfortunately, subsequent cases have not followed the
Court's disposition of the problem in this case.
2 8
The most recent example of this is Propper v. Clark,2" where the New
York law was admittedly unsettled on the question of whether title to assets
claimed by the litigants vested upon appointment of a temporary receiver or
a permanent receiver. The property in question was claimed by a federal
official under the Trading With the Enemy Act, and jurisdiction of the
district court was invoked to test the rights of the state appointed receiver.
A decision of the state question directly affected the rights of the parties to
control of the assets, and state procedures capable of providing a prompt and
dependable determination were available under the New York Declaratory
Judgment Act.3 0 The Supreme Court held that where a case involves a
nonconstitutional federal issue the federal court will decide all necessary state
and federal questions."
In order to receive the benefits of a dual judicial system it is necessary
that federal and state courts occupy themselves primarily with the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of law emanating from the sovereign which created
them. The goal is not the complete separation of federal and state questions,
that is impossible. But for the system to function smoothly, it is necessary to
perfect a set of rules whereby conflict and confusion can be minimized.3 2
It is contended that the court's refusal to entertain the case on the merits,
in the absence of special circumstances, would not only penalize the petitioner
27 See note 15 supra.
28. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 335 U, S. 701 (1948), stated that since tax liability depended on the Court's in-
terpretation of the unsettled Illinois law, common sense dictated an adjudication from
the Illinois courts if some appropriate procedure was available. Propper v. Clark, 337
U. S. 472 (1948), Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490 (1946) (jurisdiction invoked under
the Trading with the Enemy Act), Meredith v. Winter-Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943)
(jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship).
29. 337 U. S. 472 (1948) , see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion. Id. at 493.
30. N. Y. Civ. PiAc. AcT § 473.
31. This was the result reached in Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
335 U. S. 701 (1948), where federal jurisdiction was invoked under the Internal Revenue
Act. See note 28 supra.
32. WENDELL, RFLATiONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE CouRTs c. 3 (1949),
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REv: 345 (1930), Frank-
furter, Distribution of Judicid Power Between the United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L. Q. 499 (1928).
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for resorting to a jurisdiction he is entitled to invoke, but would thwart the
purpose of federal jurisdiction as well. 3  This argument is of dubious merit,
however, since the right to decline jurisdiction where a more suitable forum
exists should be inherent in every court.34 Indeed, this is the very proposition
the courts have adhered to in the forum non conveniens cases. 3-
Legal proceedings already consume extended periods of time and impose
heavy financial burdens on the parties. Their contention that once a case is
fought through its initial stages they should not be compelled to begin anew
in another forum is not without merit. And the federal courts have con-
sidered such factors as time, inconvenience and cost to the parties in arriving
at an appropriate disposition of the case.3 , When these conditions make
resort to the state courts undesirable the federal court may well be justified in
hearing the case. But where such expeditions state remedies as an applicable
Declaratory Judgment Act are available the federal court should refrain from
interpreting the state law.37
Where the circumstances make a decision on the merits undesirable the
Supreme Court has suggested several alternatives that the lower court may
follow in disposing of the matter. For example, the complaint may be dis-
missed without prejudice to an action in the state courts, or the state issues
may be decided adding a proviso that in the event the state courts should
interpret the state law otherwise the parties may apply for a modification.
In some cases the constitutionality of the statute or order may be decided and
if it is constitutional the complaint dismissed and the parties referred to the
state courts for determination of the state issues.3s Or the court may retain
jurisdiction, but refrain from exercising it pending a decision of the state
issues in the state courts.3" Congressional intervention by way of statutory
33. See note 13 supra. The power to decline jurisdiction would seem to be inherent in
every court where a more appropriate forum exists. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501 (1947) ; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 130 (1933) ; cf. Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamship, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 423 (1932) ; Heine v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 45 F.2d 426 (D. Ore. 1930), aff'd, 50 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1931) ; 54 HARV.
L. REv. 1379 (1941). For a conflicting view see 20 So. CALIF. L. REV. 217 (1946).
34. But cf. Meredith v. Winter-Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 234, 237 (1943), 18 TULANE
L. REv. 492 (1944) ; Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 208 (1938).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. See notes 16, 17, 18 supra.
37. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissents in Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 493
(1948) and Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 335 U. S. 701, 667 (1948).
38. In Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940),
the Supreme Court upheld the Railroad Commission on the constitutional issue, and
declined to enjoin it on the state ground, referring the plaintiff to the state courts for a
determination of the state law.
39. For a thorough discussion of the advisability of using the various solutions and
the situations in which they should be invoked see 54 HAR. L. REV. 1379 (1941). The
district court might be empowered to certify specific questions of state law to the Supreme
Court of the state, which would expedite final determination of the state issues at a
minimum cost to the parties. However, this presents constitutional problems which are
not within the scope of this note.
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reform has also been suggested. 40  However, a judicially conceived solution
would seem preferable since it will be equally effective in promoting a
favorable balance between the two systems, and at the same time retain flexi-
bility of application as compared to the rigidity of possible statutory change.4 1
A consistent policy requiring the parties to litigate the controversy in the
state courts would reduce the work of an already overburdened federal system.
While it is true that in some states the courts are farther behind in their work
than the federal courts, the trend has been and will probably continue toward
an ever increasing volume of purely national business incident to the ex-
pansion of the federal government.42 At the same time such a policy would
eliminate the necessity of a decision of tenuous validity by the federal court.
The position of the majority in Propper v. Clark and similar cases is
anachronistic under the philosophy of the Erie43 doctrine, which seeks uni-
formity in the application of local law. 44  If the federal court proceeds to
interpret the unsettled issue of state law and the state court in a later case
renders a contrary interpretation of that issue, the pyrrhic victory thus attained
by the party failing in the federal court, as a result of the state decision,
would afford little consolation. A policy of dismissal or similar appropriate
action would eliminate this unfortunate possibility.
A further advantage of requiring the litigants to contest the matter in the
state courts is that not only will an authoritative pronouncement of the un-
settled state law be acquired in the process, but the parties can still petition
the United States Supreme Court to review the state court's interpretation of
the federal issues involved.45 Contrast this with a final adjudication of the
40. Id. at 1381; 53 COL. L. Rv. 788 (1944).
41. In Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), Mr. Justice
Frankfurter states that: "The use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in
furthering the harmonious relations between state and federal authority without the need
of rigorous restrictions of those powers." 22 IND. L. J. 87 (1946). H. R. 4168, 79th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946), would eliminate diversity jurisdiction if enacted.
42. WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS (1949); FRANIC-
FURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREmE COURT 289, 290 (1927) ; Frank-
furter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between the United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L. Q. 499, 504 (1928) ; COL. L. REv. 925 (1941) ; 54 HARv. L. REV. 1379, 1380
(1941).
43. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
44. The Erie doctrine is not limited to diversity cases. The error in thus limiting it
arises from confusing those cases in which a federal right is asserted with those in which
the right is a state created one. 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 165 (1948) ; 7 U. OF CH. L.
REv. 727 (1940).
45. Where a state statute or administrative order has been attacked as repugnant to
the Federal Constitution and the decision of the state court is in favor of the validity of
the state law, appeal to the United States Supreme Court will lie. 62 STAT. 929,
28 U. S. C. § 1257(2) (1948). However, when the state court's interpretation of the state
law necessitates a determination of the application of a federal statute, resort to the
Supreme Court is available by certiorari only. 62 STAT. 929, 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3)
(1948).
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'state issues in the federal courts from which there is no recourse if 'they are
incorrectly decided.
In addition, a policy' o voluntary abstention by the federal courts would
be a constructive step toward securing a proper balance between the state ana
federal judiciaries. The logic of this solution is apparent when it is recalled
that the federal issue may have been prematurely asserted because one of the
alternative answers to the underlying state problem will obviate the necessity
of deciding the federal question. A decision of the state issue is inevitable
wfiile the necessity of resolving the federal question is conjectural. Thus the
superiority of the federal court in deciding questions of national law, which
is the very foundation of federal jurisdiction in these cases, is relegated to a
position of secondary importance.4 6 In view of this, the federal courts should
decline to exercise jurisdiction thereby necessitating litigation of the matter
in a forum well qualified to perform this function.1
7
46. This would seem to apply with equal validity where federal jurisdiction is based
on diversity of citizenship. See note 44 supra. The Supreme Court, however, when pre-
sented with precisely this problem in Meredith v. Winter-Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943),
referred to the Erie doctrine as a mandate requiring a decision of all state questions
whether the law was settled or susceptible of varying interpretations. This position does
not appear to be in harmony with the tenet of uniformity sought in the Erie case. WEN-
DELL, RELATIONs BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS C. 12 (1949) ; Collier, A Plea
Against Jurisdiction for Diversity of Citizenship, 76 CENT. L. J. 263, 264 (1913) ; 41 Cot.
L. REV. 925 (1941); 7 U. OF CmI. L. REV. 727 (1940). But see Parker, The Federal
Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A. B. A. J. 433 (1932) ; Yntema and Jaffin,
Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 869, 887 (1931);
18 TUL. L. REv. 492 (1944).
47. The subsequent history of some of the cases discussed appears in the following
material. No analysis of the facts stated has been undertaken herein.
In the following cases the federal court refused to entertain the matter on the merits,
thereby requiring litigation in the state courts. After the Supreme Court decision in the
Pullman case, plaintiff filed suit in the state district court challenging the railroad com-
mission's order on federal as well as state grounds. A temporary injunction was granted,
but for extrinsic reasons the case has never been tried. Following the decision in Chicago
v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. the matter was litigated in the state courts. Evidently the Su-
preme Court of Illinois did not consider the federal issue since the court ruled adversely
to the plaintiff without discussing the federal question. Dean Milk Co. v. Chicago, 385
Ill. 565, 53 N. E.2d 612 (1944). The case was not presented to the federal court again
.since the city of Chicago amended the ordinance in question promptly after the Illinois
court decided the case. Approximately two years elapsed from the time of the Supreme
Court decision until final judgment was obtained in the state courts. Following the
A. F. of L. v. Watson decision suit was filed in the state court in May, 1946. The Attor-
ney General's objection to the joinder of actions was sustained. Plaintiff appealed and
in July, 1947, the state supreme court dismissed the appeal. This would have necessitated
filing six or seven separate suits; so the Florida litigation was dropped pending decision
in Nebraska, Arizona and North Carolina on similar amendments. These cases reached
the United States Supreme Court during the October term 1948. After the decision in
Spector Motor Co. v. Mc Laughlin, a declatory judgment was sought in the Connecticut
courts. By agreement trial was delayed until April, 1947. The Supreme Court of Errors
decided the appeal in July, 1948, and action on the federal question is still proceeding in
the federal courts. See 1 STAN. L. REv. 551 (1949) for a discussion of the action in the
state courts. Two' federal circuit courts came to opposite conclusions on the state issue
presented in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. before the Illinois Supreme Court
NOTES
MUNICIPALITIES
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON INDEBTEDNESS
Two recent decisions of the Indiana Supreme' Court have pointed to the
need of a solution to the recurring problem of municipal indebtedness. The
difficulty has roots in the internal improvement boom of the middle 19th
century.' After every hamlet, township, and county had over-burdened
itself with debt, 2 an overdue accounting was begun in the 1870's 3 culminating
decided the question in a similar case which had proceeded through the state cotirts. Suit
was brought in the state court, following the Thompson decision, in June, 1940, and while
pending a compromise settlement was reached. Best estimates are that it would have
taken approximately two years to complete litigation in the Illinois courts.
The following are cases where the federal court proceeded to judgment on all issues,
state and federal. No subsequent decisions, construing the unsettled state question, have
been rendered by the state courts since the federal court's decision in Estate of Spiegel v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 335 U. S. 701 (1948); Meredith v. Winter-Haven, 320
U. S. 228 (1943) ; and Mac Gregor v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 315 U. S. 280 (1941).
Nor has there been a subsequent decision by the Illinois courts inconsistent with the con-
clusion reached by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
This information was received through the courtesy of Mr. Ireland Graves of Austin,
Texas, counsel for the Pullman Co.; Mr. Cecil A. Morgan of Fort Worth, Texas, coun-
sel for the pullman conductors; Mr. Albert E. Hallett of Chicago, Ill., ainicus curiae in the
Ficldcrest case; Mr. Herbert S. Thatcher of Washington, D. C., counsel for the A. F. of
L.; Mr. Cyril Coleman of Hartford, Conn., counsel for the Spector Motor Co.; Mr. Craig
Van Meter of Mattoon, Ill., counsel for the Magnolia Petroleum Co.; Mr. Thos. T.
Railey of St. Louis, Mo., counsel for Thompson, trustee of the Missouri Pac. R. R.;
Mr. Herbert A. Friedlich of Chicago, Ill., counsel for the Spiegel estate; Mr. D. C. Hull
of De Land, Fla., counsel for Meredith; Mr. William B. Giles of Detroit, Mich., counsel
for Mac Gregor; and Mr. Herbert Pope of Chicago, Ill., counsel for Stuart.
1. The War of 1812 had made it clear that both military and economic considera-
tions demanded the development of transportation facilities. See PAxSoN, HISTORY OF THE
AMuERICAN FRONTIER C. 29 (1924). There was also arising at this time in settlements,
once only temporary in nature but rapidly taking on marks of permanence, a longing for
the modern conveniences of the day. See BOND, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE OLD NORTHrwEsT
c. 11, 13 (1934). "The completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 and the first steam
locomotive in the early 1830's had a great influence in transferring dormant desires into
fervent action." WAY, THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY AND INTERNAL IMPRO EMENTS 111 (1910).
"Indiana, for example, began work on the Wabash Canal in 1832 and at the same time
chartered several railroads. Four years later, the Legislature authorized the sale of
municipal bonds to the extent of $10,000,000 to aid internal improvements, an average
of over twenty dollars for every inhabitant of the state." CLARK, THE WEST IN AmERICAN
HISTORY 333 (1937).
2. The total national figure of municipal indebtedness in 1880 was placed at
$728,000,000. The sum is impressive when considered with the fact that in 1840 local
debt had amounted to scarcely $20,000,000. In general, see DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES c. 7 (1924). Indiana's share of the 1880 burden has been estimated
at $20,000,000. See Zwerner, Indiana Municipal Revenue Bond Financing, 12 IND. L. J.
266, 268 (1936). Of course the defaults, bankruptcies, and staggering tax burdens which
resulted were unexpected; there seems to have existed an overall confidence when the
indebtedness was being incurred that "tolls and tariffs would soon produce an income
sufficient to relieve the people from taxation for the support of the government." CLARK,
op. cit. supra n. 1, at 333.
3. State governments also caught the "craze to go in debt," in most instances at an
even earlier date than their subordinate units. It was from the states themselves that the
first aid for railroad and canal building was sought. Fortunately, however, extension of
state credit was effectively checked by 1860, in Indiana in 1851. IND. C NST. Art. 10, § 5.
